Legitimization of educational practice
In one of the early stages of the passage of society from a traditional to a modern way of life - even before it was possible to define them as really modern societies - a change occurred in the legitimization of education. In traditional societies, this legitimization is mainly ritualistic. According to it, the accepted patterns of educational practice are good because they are accepted, or because they have always been accepted according to the common beliefs. Their acceptance granted them the status of basic facts of life, and anyone trying to change them was viewed as damaging and undermining these basics. Except for short periods of change in people's views, which were usually accompanied by crises, the individual living in a traditional society rarely faced alternatives of educational practice. His identification with the society in which he lived always included an identification with one given type of education, accepted and even sanctified by the society, and - according to most of its members - the only possible and acceptable type.

When traditional societies began to undergo changes, the ritualistic legitimization of education gave way to a new type of legitimization - the ideological legitimization of education. The latter has two attributes: one involves the appearance of a recognition of their right to choose the type of education that suits their tastes, their values, their aims, their understanding, etc. In view of this new realization, they no longer feel obliged to the accepted education only because it is the accepted type. The second attribute requires the simultaneous existence of several conceptions of education, from which one may choose the type of education suitable to one's weltanschauung. When people recognize their right to choose the education suitable to them (and no longer to act according to accepted tradition), and when different educational conceptions are available to them, then begins the modern era in education - the era of ideological legitimization of education.

Ideologies as cognitive systems
Several cognitive systems serve man in discovering and inventing the meaning of the world and of life, and to derive an orientation for his actions. Ideologies are such cognitive systems. Other cognitive systems, used by man to achieve the same aims, are science, philosophy, religion and art, as well as astrology and magic, various occult creeds and combinations of prejudices and superstitions. Many people use these various systems indiscriminately, one or the other, in one area of life or another. Some adhere to a constant of cognitive systems, which they use with relative consistency. For example, some people rely on science only in regard to their work and their health; as regarding politics, they rely on ideology; and as for social issues - on prejudices.
These different cognitive systems fulfill the same roles in people's lives: they bestow meaning to their lives and direct their actions, each in its own way, none encompassing all areas of life. The way in which people use the various cognitive systems, the various areas in which they activate one or another type of system, the frequency and dominance of the use of the various cognitive systems - all are characteristics of social groups in various periods of their histories.\(^1\) We may discern in the history of a given society a period in which magical thinking was dominant in the people's thinking; in other periods, religious, scientific, or ideological thinking may have been dominant.

As the different cognitive systems are dominant in the consciousness of the majority of a given society, they become *social control mechanisms*. In saying that education in modern society functions by means of an ideological legitimization, we are saying two things: (a) Ideologies are cognitive systems that clarify to people the essence and aims of education, and the criteria by which people choose the type of education they prefer over others; (b) Ideologies are social control mechanisms, by means of which agreement is reached in various societies about the accepted ways of educational practice, through which these societies try to ensure their continuity. Clarification of the connection between the ideologies as cognitive systems used by individuals and as social control mechanisms, and between educational thought, requires that we first note their structure and the connection between them and their function.

**Ideologies control people's behavior, but people do not control their ideologies**

Ideologies - as most (if not all) theories of ideology claim - act as a control mechanism on people's actions in their social and political lives. The assumption in these theories - sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit - is that *ideologies can fill this role of control mechanisms because people cannot control their ideologies to the same extent that they can control their scientific research, their philosophic thinking or their practical actions*.\(^2\) People's lack of ability to control their ideological thinking is well marked in the fact that but few of the adherents of ideologies ever renounce them. The detachment of a person from his ideology is usually a difficult and painful process. Once a person has adopted a certain ideology, he is loyal to it even when many facts of reality contradict, according to people holding other ideologies, the very fundamentals of the ideology he holds. For many who have denounced their ideological beliefs, this detachment entailed a crisis no less powerful than that of people who have lost their religious faith. Autobiographies of those whom "the gods have failed"\(^3\) testify to the claim that ideologies are very stable constructs in people's consciousness.

Yet this does not explain sufficiently what it is in ideologies that provides them with this stability in people's consciousness. Those dealing with this issue were mostly
content with comparing ideology to religion. The element of faith ensures the stability of a person's attachment to his religion, as well as ensuring the endurance of ideologies and people's devotion to them (hence the reference to ideologies as "religious atheism" or "secular religion"). The use of this analogy is not necessarily justified, as people's attitude toward their religions cannot explain their attitude toward ideologies, if only for the fact that most people are born and raised into their religion, and this fact plays a major role in their attitude toward it. People see ideologies as their viewpoint of choice, set of ideas or methods of thought, that they have rationally chosen when deciding among available alternatives. It is therefore not sufficient to define ideology as a belief similar to religion (although it is such); we have to explain which of the ideology's characteristics make it grasped by people as similar to a religious belief even though they have not been born and raised into it. Without knowing these characteristics and understanding the way ideologies function, we will not be able to know or understand how they function so efficiently as controlling mechanisms of people's actions in their social and political environment.

That which causes ideologies to control people's actions in society and politics so efficiently, is also responsible for the fact that they are not able to control their ideologies efficiently. In order to explain these two phenomena we need to note the epistemological implication of the structure of the ideologies, and to examine the circumstances in which people choose their ideologies.

**The epistemological meaning of the structure of ideologies**

What differentiates between different cognitive systems, and what singles out each of them? Each system is a specific strategy of man to assaulted reality in order to understand it. Each causes the activation of different types of mental and spiritual abilities in order to understand the world and to know how to act in it. The mental and spiritual abilities required in the scientific approach are different from those in the religious approach, or the philosophic approach, and so on.

The ideological strategy is different from all other cognitive strategies in two aspects. First, it is simply different, otherwise it would be absorbed into one of them; if ideology were not different from philosophy or religion, it would itself be philosophy or religion. This observation is meant for those who claim that philosophy, religion, or even science in some parts, are nothing but an ideology. If this were so, it would not be possible to distinguish between them. Second, the other cognitive systems are primary strategies, while ideology is a cognitive system that activates several strategies all borrowed form the other cognitive systems. Ideology is not a science, a religion or a philosophy, but has some of each. Ideology is a cognitive system created from a combination of different approaches and modes of thinking that have joined together to form a new kind of approach and thinking.
A comprehensive ideological text (or any other form of comprehensive ideological expression) has four components, differing from each other in the types of human abilities that create them. One is the diagnostic component present in every ideology, composed of propositions answering the question "what is?" This is the type of proposition used by science to present its findings. Scientific information, or a diagnostic proposition representing it, is not such because it is necessarily true. For generations, the common diagnosis was that the sun revolved around the earth. This was a diagnostic assertion, albeit untrue. Physicians aim in their work to arrive at diagnoses, not all of which are necessarily true. What defines a proposition as diagnostic is its content, answering the question "what is?" and the structure fitting this content.

Let us illustrate this component (and the others) by means of an ideological text par excellence - maybe the most outstanding such text - the *Communist Manifesto*. One of the (many) diagnostic propositions in its first pages is:

The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

The diagnostic proposition in this paragraph answers the question "what is?" There is a class society of a new type. The class antagonisms upon which society is based have remained as they were. Only the classes have changed, and the forms of struggle among them. In many ideologies of national liberation, the diagnosis determines that the state of the people is caused by oppression. In racist ideologies, the diagnosis states that contact between the races is the root of all evil, etc.

The second component of every ideology is the eschatological one. The propositions composing it answer the question "what should be?" *The Communist Manifesto* promises:

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class; if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.
In place of the old bourgeois society with its classes and the antagonisms between them, there will be an association in which "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."

In this ideology, the abolition of class antagonisms is presented as a precondition to the abolition of all evil in the world. The eschatological component of ideologies is loaded with a messianic meaning such as that found in monotheistic religions. In the ideology of oppressed peoples, national liberation is conceived as a condition for a solution to all the problems harassing human beings. In the ideology of progress, the messiah is expected in the future; in conservative ideologies, he has already come in the past, and people must make an effort to maintain in the present what already existed in the past. Each ideology carries a messiah in some dimension of time.

A classless society such as that presented in the *Communist Manifesto* is a one in which people are not estranged, are self-aware, know their world as it is, and so on. This eschatology is a vision that causes man to deny his present society and wish to destroy it, because one relatively small class exploits the labor of the largest class, in a society in which both exploiters and exploited are estranged, and in which existence determines consciousness, and consciousness does not determine existence.

The third component of each ideology includes propositions telling us what we should do in order to make the available, that is the content of the diagnosis, into the desirable, that is into the eschatological. This component includes a choice of one of the possible strategies: to strive for the desirable by means of information and education, political action, revolution and a seizure of power, or by other means. "The proletarians," say Marx and Engels in their manifest, "have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property." They must do this - no doubt about that - by means of a revolution.

Strategic thinking, leading to a choice of one of the alternatives of action, is vital to people in all their actions. As ideologies were created in order to direct people's actions for making changes or preventing them, they include a strategic approach. In most areas of action people feel an emotional commitment toward the aims; and on the other hand - an emotional openness or lack of involvement toward the means. Strategy is the use of means, therefore the attitude of people toward strategy is usually emotionally neutral. This is not the case for ideologies. Each ideology is a commitment toward a certain type of strategy: revolutionary, reformist or conservative. People do not "use" revolution or reform as they use a machine or a tool. Man is revolutionary, reformist or conservative; the means of his ideology are part of his identity.
The fourth and last component of every ideology includes a definition of certain publics, and answers the questions "for whom?" and "by whom?" One public is defined in each ideology as its carrier, the public meant to realize it; another public is that on whose behalf the first group acts.

The carriers of the ideology presented in the *Communist Manifesto* are the members of the revolutionary party, communists, about whom the manifest states that they are "practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the lines of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement." On the other hand, the public on whose behalf the revolutionary party acts is the proletariat, of whom the manifest writes: "Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a genuinely revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product." It is in order to liberate it that this ideology came into being, and a revolutionary party must act for its sake. Two such publics are presented in each ideology. The essence of this component is identification. A holder of an aristocratic ideology identifies with the aristocracy; a holder of a nationalistic ideology - with his nation; a holder of a racist ideology - with his own race, and so on.

Each of the four components of ideology also serves man outside the ideologies. People try to answer the diagnostic questions in their scientific and practical life. They strive for the ideal of the desirable in their moral, religious, utopian thought; try to solve many practical problems through the use of various strategies; and identify with several publics, such as their family, the inhabitants of their area of residence, their church, their culture or humanity as a whole.

**When the four components coalesce, they form an ideology; and in their coalescence, each loses its original characteristics.** Diagnosis in an ideology is no longer such as in science or practical action. It is affected by eschatology, that is the longing for the desirable; by the previous choice of strategy and of preferred publics. A diagnosis influenced by what man desires, by the method of action acceptable to him, and by what fits with his belonging to a certain group or with his identification with it, is not a proper diagnosis but a thought derived from aspirations. This is also true for each of the other components, affecting the diagnosis and affected by it and by all the other components. The coalescence of these four components forms an ideology that constitutes a consolidated structure not easily dissoluble, and resistant to changes. Even a partial change in one of the components creates a new ideology.

The diagnosis, the eschatology and the publics are identical in the communistic and socialistic ideologies. These ideologies differed in their time only as to their decisions
on the best strategy. Because of these differences in means the agreement about goals was forgotten, as well as about evaluating the situation and about the public on behalf of which they both wanted to act. The rich history of ideological controversies has not produced many examples of such acute rivalry as between the followers of these two close ideologies. This rivalry came about because ideological strategy is not only a decision about means, but is an inseparable part of the whole ideological structure. A revolution is not only a means of ideology, like revolutionism or conservatism; it is a comprehensive conception of political action, or even more - of life as a whole. It absorbed diagnostic and eschatological implications as well as identification with certain publics.

The coalescence of the different components into a new epistemological structure involves the appearance of a special language, the ideological language, among whose characteristics is the frequent use of certain types of **metaphors and para-theoretical propositions**. "The capitalistic regime is dying" is a typical ideological metaphor. It causes the idea that the social regime is similar to an organism to penetrate into the consciousness of the user as well as the hearer, without spelling it out specifically. Like any organism, the time of its death has come. The question is naturally asked what will replace it. Here, the eschatology provides an answer about the way it will happen, and strategy also gives its answer. The metaphors tie together the different and foreign components, and enable their being absorbed into consciousness as if they were an organic and primary unity.

The para-theoretical propositions act in a similar manner; a para-theoretical proposition is factual in its structure, but is in fact an evaluative proposition. "The American imperialism prepares the subjugation of peoples to exploitation by means of movie and television films." This proposition contains two evaluations: American imperialism creates movie and television films in order to subjugate the peoples; movie and television films fulfill this role. Both of these evaluations are not presented in an ideological language as evaluations, but as diagnostic propositions. Through these mechanisms, the ideological language blurs the original differences between the components of the ideology. This blurring prevents people from examining the ideological diagnosis separately from all other components of the ideology, and the other components separately from the diagnosis. This coalescence, with the transformation it brings about in its components, causes ideology to be impermeable to critical examination or to a rational attitude by its followers.

The limitation of the semantic-epistemological explanation of the effect of ideology on people's consciousness is based on the fact that different people have different attitudes toward their ideologies. Along with those who experienced a great shock from the loss of an ideological faith, such as that experienced by the hero of "Lean" (Where to) by Mordechai Ze'ev Feirberg (1874-1899, Russia), others change ideologies quite often without paying it the least notice. Understanding the differences
in intensity of the faith of believers requires paying attention to the types of circumstances in which man adopts his ideological faith.

**The circumstances in which people choose their ideologies**

Although the drive for action is one of the essential features of man, the direction of his action is not given to him - he must choose it. Many times man must choose the aims of his action simultaneously with his action.

In most situations of life, several options of action are open to people without their being able to prefer one of them rationally or empirically, but also without being able to act in each situation in more than one way. In a revolution, for example, a person must decide whether he joins it, fights against it, hides from it, etc., without knowing in advance which of these ways will prove to be the wisest, and without being able to act in more than one way at a time. A choice in such a situation and in countless other situations is an ideological choice, and its indications are:

1. It is vital to act.
2. There is more than one way to act.
3. It is impossible to decide rationally or empirically between the options.
4. One must therefore choose between the possible courses of action without having all the data needed for decision.

The conditions in which people must choose one of the ideologies are present in circumstances differing in the intensity of the threat they pose for people. The situation in which one must decide whether to join a revolution or oppose it is different from that in which he must choose between rival parties in an election; the situation in which a person deliberates in times of war whether to be a conscientious objector is different from that in which he has to choose in a secret ballot between a party advocating public housing and one who opposes it. The choices in all of these issues, as in many others, are ideological choices; but they differ in the intensity of threat they pose for the one who chooses. The essence of this threat is the pre-knowledge of the punishment awaiting him who has chosen wrongly. The severity of the punishment in such a case determines the intensity of conflict that he faces.

People who join a revolution or enlist against it must decide between conflicting loyalties, toward all of which they have a commitment. The essence of the contrast is in commitments demanding conflicting actions that cannot be compromised, and therefore he must prefer one upon the others without having the appropriate tools upon which to base this preference.

Europe in the era between the world wars illustrates an extreme situation in which people had to make ideological choices. The intense world-wide economic crisis at that time, the unemployment accompanying it, the collapse of the banks, the loss of savings etc., destroyed the beliefs according to which people had acted until then.
People lost their certainty in an orderly society. The feeling of arbitrariness began to permeate people's consciousness, causing some to become indifferent, and some to become disorderly. The adoption of a new faith is an existential imperative in such a situation, and indeed this is what happened: Europe was divided among those who chose communism and those who chose fascism. After they had chosen a new ideology that saved them from uncertainty, its essence was no longer important to them. They felt a commitment to these ideologies for saving them from despair and from a lack of meaning in life. This gratitude caused many to be loyal to the ideologies of their choice during those terrifying times, even when these ideologies led them to a terror even more severe than that from which they had saved them.

In order for a person to realize his error after he has chosen an ideology in a moment of great existential anxiety, he will have to admit that he had acted in haste and without due thought, out of stress and fear, in short - that his choice attest to his stupidity. Very few people can live with such a self-image. The rich autobiographical literature by those whom "god has failed" points to the source of their grave commitment to their ideologies. Such a commitment is formed when people pick an ideology in a state of conflict fraught with anxiety. The stronger the threat to the one who makes the choice, the more committed he will be to the ideology, which points to the fact that a person's control over his ideological beliefs is a function of his state when choosing them.

To sum up: the structure of his ideology hinders a person from controlling it - from being responsible for his ideas and beliefs. If the state in which the person had chosen his ideology was fraught with anxieties, his commitment to it will continue to strengthen, and he will become a helpless believer who has no control over his ideas and beliefs but is controlled by them. Man's social functions do not permit him to live and act without an ideology, and his rational control of these functions is not possible as long as they are controlled by ideologies. Is there a way out of this dilemma? Yes there is, but it is also an ideological one.

**Educational decisions are all ideological decisions**

When a baby is born, it is clear to all concerned that they must nourish it, usually through his mother's nursing it. Nursing is therefore a function derived from the state in which those who consider themselves responsible for the baby find themselves. Yet the need to nurse a baby (or nourish it in some other way) cannot be fulfilled without prior decisions about such questions as: Must it be fed at regular hours? At what intervals? Is it better to follow a demand schedule?

The state in which these people find themselves is typical of the appearance of ideologies. First, in this state there is an imperative for action (nourishing). Second, there are alternative ways of action (feeding every two hours; every four hours; whenever the baby cries, or all possibilities). Third, it is impossible to prefer one way
of action by means of rational consideration or by scientific experimentation. Each mother must decide between the various possibilities, and mothers actually do. Most act according to common practices (i.e., according to another's decision). These decisions, whether made by the mothers themselves or by others for them, illustrate the essence of an ideological decision.

Is it really impossible to prefer logically or experimentally one method of nourishing above others? Let us assume that an accredited scientist has published results showing that feeding at regular internals affect positively the internal secretions in the baby's body. Let us assume that another scientist has found that demand feeding increases the self-assurance of people who had been so fed as babies. The mother (or society) who will adopt the first findings will do so because it had a prior preference to the "physical health" ideology; while the mother (or society) who will adopt the second is one who follows the "mental health" ideology.

People use rational reasons to defend or substantiate their ideological choices. These choices do not validly testify about the holders, but only about their mental needs and prior preferences. In societies in which a regular schedule of nursing is preferred, arguments may be given such as: "Regular feeding gives the baby a sense of order and stability, forming a basis for his self-assurance;" or, "Regular feeding teaches the baby to delay satisfaction, which he will enjoy more at the proper time." In societies preferring demand feeding, the reasons may be, "demand feeding affords the baby a sense of security, as it prevents the fear that he may have been abandoned by his mother." Not one of these ideas may be proved or disproved by reasons based on developmental research. They are derived from ideologies, that is, from a decision for the preferred alternative. Conformist mothers adopt the ideologies of their society. When this ideology is shaken, they turn to new ideologies offering preferences about the issue in question. In this case they choose the alternative that seems preferable to them without a sound basis for their new belief. However, since this is a matter of great importance to them, having to do with their baby's future, they must form a deep conviction that the chosen way of nursing is the best alternative.

As in nursing, so it is in all educational issues. People must choose between alternatives for action before they can act. Should the child be toilet-trained? If so, how: by establishing habits; by disciplining; by preaching and scolding; by rewards and punishments? Should the child be taught manners, or is his or her behavior in public ignored? Should curiosity be encouraged or discouraged? Should certain character traits be promoted? Should both sexes be brought up together or separately? What should be taught and how? etc. In short, education is primarily a process of decision between alternatives of action, including the decision not to act at all. And all these decisions are ideological. They are not scientific conclusions based on facts, or philosophical conclusions based on consideration and logic. The arguments in favor of certain educational actions or those justifying them and negating others are always
ideological, even when they pretend to derive from a philosophy of education or a (scientific) educational theory.

The argument claiming that every educational decision is ideological is applicable to all levels of educational activity. Probably no one would claim otherwise about decisions on the political level. Laws of compulsory education and its duration; the level of allocation of economic resources to education in comparison to other areas of social activity; the uniform organization of the educational system for all children; a class or cultural segregation in schools; religious education for all or separation of religion from public education, etc - all are clearly ideological decisions, everywhere and always, and can be nothing else.

Education functions according to ideological decisions not only on the political level. There are also necessarily ideological decisions on the professional level. On the pedagogical level, decisions about the methods of educational activity (such as authoritarianism versus permissiveness, separate versus co-education of the sexes, etc.) are all ideological - dependent on prior commitments to certain value judgements and opposition to others. These decisions have nothing to do with facts or with an understanding of the educational processes.

The educational story continues along ideological lines. Operational decisions referred to in education as didactics (including choice of syllabus, preference of instruction methods and student assessment methods) are all ideological. Such decisions are usually well couched, and presented as if they derive from philosophical (what to teach), psychological (how to teach) and research (how to assess achievement) considerations. Outside the school - at home, at the club or youth movement - decisions at this level are also ideological. The conviction of some parents that a child must be punished for an immoral act (such as stealing); or the belief of other parents that such act must be handled through discussing the problem, preaching and the like but not by punishment; or the belief of others that there should be no parental intervention, as theft at an early age is only a developmental stage to be overcome naturally - are all ideological beliefs guiding the various educational decisions.

This is also the case for decisions on the operational level. All that happens at school, in the home, in the youth movement or anywhere else under the title "education" is done according to the ideological choice of the educators. Even when it seems to them that their actions are derived from theories and accepted professional teachings, they are in fact the result of ideological decisions.

In short, all that is said in education, whether termed philosophy of education or pedagogy, theory of education or didactics, educational outlook or any other name, is nothing but ideology.6
This leads us to a far-reaching conclusion: Educational practice is not the need of those being educated but of those wishing to educate - the educators. This need is expressed by their preferred ideologies. This means that one must look for the answer to the question about the essence of education in the needs of the educators and not in the characteristics of the children or in their upbringing. Since this claim may be surprising, let us illustrate it by going back to the example of nursing. The baby needs its mother's milk, but milk is not education. The education entailed in nursing, according to people's conceptions, is the mode of nursing: at regular intervals or on demand, etc. The educational rationale supporting nursing at regular intervals is that the baby thus gains self-assurance, delayed satisfaction or other traits. The educational rationale supporting demand nursing claims that the baby thus gains trust in its mother, and an enhanced self-regulation. The mother must nurse without knowing which of the ways is better, but she must decide between them in order to be able to act. This educational decision is hers and not the baby's, who certainly has no opinion about whether delayed satisfaction is better than self-regulation or vice versa. Moreover, when the mother chooses among alternatives of a necessary action, she is relieved of the pressure of indecision even though her choice is in no way supported by clear-cut accepted proofs. Her choice is clearly a preference derived from a belief in one of the acceptable alternatives. She has chosen, as most people do, according to her values, her inclinations, her attitude toward those acting in one or the other way - but never according to a rational and objective examination of the alternatives. What are the alternatives among which an educator may choose?

**Meta-ideologies of education**

Education is meant to serve three masters, to use a metaphoric expression. Its three clients are society, culture, and the individual; and they are its basic elements in any educational state. Yet the interests of each of these three are not identical and not even similar, and their expectations of education are usually not similar. Their interests are in fact contradictory - that is, advancing the interests of each of the three contradict those of the other two. This means that each educational ideology is a choice in favor of one of the three basic elements present in every educational situation: society, culture or the individual. It is an ideological choice, whereby followers of the first ideology give preference to society, followers of the second - to culture, and followers of the third - to the individual. This argument needs clarification, in order to understand the basic conflict leading to the different ideologies of education.

Society looks upon the individual as a bundle of roles, and education is the process of preparing the individual to fulfill these roles. Father and son, man and woman, employer and employee, clerk and client, bus-driver and passenger, teacher and pupil, teacher and principal, officer and soldier, are all complementary roles. People are not born knowing how to fulfill these roles, and must be taught to do so. The perpetuation of society requires that the generations of human beings will fulfill the required roles,
for without them society cannot exist, and without society human beings cannot exist. Society always means present-day society, not what it was in the past nor an ideal future society.

If the existence of a particular society, such as present-day Western society, is based on social inequality, then the role of education derives from society's interest to prepare some of the youth for roles as privileged citizens and others - for underprivileged citizens. If the existence of present-day society is based on the oppression of another people, then education's role will be to prepare the children to function as oppressors, and it will have to instill in them a rationale for this oppression. From society's point of view, an educated person is he who can function in his various roles according to the accepted norms of his society.

From the point of view of culture, man and education appear otherwise. Here, a person is not merely a bundle of roles he has learned to fulfill according to society's accepted norms, but first and foremost a creature aspiring to knowledge and able to use it; a creature controlled by his conscience, that tells him the difference between good and evil, a difference independent of the actual needs of his society or even of himself; a creature with esthetic sensitivity who reacts in different ways to beauty and ugliness, and endowed with other characteristics emanating from human nature that has actualized through culture.

Culture in this context is taken to mean all the institutional arrangements, and all human characteristics fostered throughout history by man's aspiration to improve and to achieve perfection. Therefore, education is a process anchoring the individual in the historic partnership of humankind, from which culture has evolved. An educated person is a cultured person, and the uneducated lack culture. The cultured person is the one controlled by values and preferences stemming from culture rather than the one controlled by the fleeting needs of society or by his own passing desires or caprice. The fact that a certain society at a certain stage of its existence needs inequality or oppression does not justify inequality or oppression or permit to present them as values worth educating for. The status of the values of equality and liberty is independent of temporary social interest or of man's impulsive whims. Education is not meant to serve passing interests or instinctive inclinations, but is the carrier of values whose status in culture is stable and whose long-term existence has proved their necessity for the survival and development of human society.

From the point of view of the ideological choice preferring the individual above the two other basic elements of education, education is not perceived as a preparation for life in a society, or as an initiation of the individual into a culture. The ideological preference of the individual over society and culture points to an expectation from education to support the growth of the individual. In the course of education he will
realize himself by having his own needs fulfilled and by being given the opportunity to exercise his abilities and capabilities.

Educators holding this view of education judge its success by the extent of self-realization of the individual, who is in their view the criterion for all other things. They claim that it is not the task of education to teach the needs of society or to transfer cultural values from one generation to the next. They conceive the task of education as supporting the development of the individual, and their basic elements determines that people whose development has not been hindered will find their place in society and in culture. Man's development takes its own direction, just as does the development of a frog or an oak. It is not society who turns the child into a human being by training him for different roles he will fill in it; nor does culture turn him into a human being by equipping him with its values. A human being is born human just as a frog is born frog-like, and an oak - oak-like. The function of education is to enable the human qualities with which man is born to come into their full expression.

Every question the educators must answer through their actions has three essential answers, articulated in different ways. Each of these answers excludes the others: it is impossible, for example, to punish a child and not punish it at the same time. One educational theory (that is, one ideology) advocates punishment as a reaction to certain behavior; the others deny punishment as an educational means. It is impossible to educate a child according to the scientific and rational approach demanded by one ideology, and at the same time according to a mystical and magical approach required by another. It is impossible to simultaneously foster conformity and non-conformity, as each of these is an aim dictated by a different educational ideology.

It seems that the only solution in such a situation is to prefer one of the basic elements of education and to disregard the other two. Yet such a disregard is also impossible. No educational theory can free itself from the demands of society (to train young people to take part in it), from the demands of culture (to enforce values on people's personalities), and from the demands of the individual's development (as such). Therefore, anyone taking a stand on educational problems - whether professional philosopher, teacher, father or citizen interested in education - can only grade the three basic elements of education (society, culture and the individual) according to his own preference, that is place one above and over the other two. This is what people in fact do. Some place society at the top of the preference ladder, thus subjecting the concerns of culture and of the individual to it. These educational theories will henceforth be referred to as "the educational theories of socialization."

Others place culture at the top of the preference ladder, thus subjecting to it theories referring to society and the individual. These will be referred to as "the educational theories of acculturation".
There are those who place the individual at the top of the preference ladder, subjecting the issues of society and culture to the developmental needs of the individual. These will be referred to as "the educational theories of individuation."

Each of these educational theories is an ideology, and the above-mentioned types are the meta-ideologies of education. A "meta-ideology" is a pattern of choices about the basic issues of education indicating the internal consistency derived from preference of one of the basic elements of the educational state. Each one of the meta-ideologies may hold many educational theories different from each other in their formulation and terminology, but not in the conclusions drawn from them about the methods of action of educators. Alongside these educational theories are many others, representing attempts to integrate the premises of the different meta-ideologies. The drive to create educational theories integrating the premises of two or all three of the meta-ideologies derives from the fact that the aims of all three are acceptable to people. They accept the education of young people for future adaptation to their society, just as they accept (and even wish) that their children will want to orient their lives according to values they have absorbed; and to no lesser extent do they wish them to realize themselves, their abilities and capabilities in the process of their development. Simultaneous functioning according to all three aims is impossible not due to the aims, but due to the means required by them.

Each of the educational ideologies has a given system of means (strategy) whose status, dictated by the ideological character of these teachings, is similar to the status of the aims (eschatology). These means exclude each other, since it is impossible to operate means deriving from different ideologies simultaneously. It is impossible to create an educational atmosphere governed by obedience, and at the same time promote an ambience of freedom; it is impossible to create an atmosphere deriving from respect of the self-regulation of young people, and at the same time instruct and conduct them toward aims chosen for them by adults. One educational ideology conditions the achievement of its aims upon promoting obedience, while the other conditions the achievement of its aims upon respecting the self-regulation of the growing child. There is nothing wrong with achieving the aims of both ideologies, but it is impossible to integrate the means they advocate. The educator aspiring to the aims of both will fail at achieving them, as it is impossible to impose at the same time an atmosphere evoking obedience and a mode of education sanctifying the freedom of the child. Each of these meta-ideologies answers the same questions as the others do, but their answers are different. We shall present a gist of the three ideologies by using a schematic formulation of their answers to the basic questions asked by each educational teaching.

The basic questions of education, according to the ideological components:
A. Diagnostic questions
(1) What is the essence of society, and which of its needs must be fulfilled by education?
(2) What is culture and what are the roles of education within it?
(3) What is the nature of the individual? Should this nature affect the direction of education, and if so - how?

B. Eschatological questions
(4) What are the aims that the average society dictates to education?
(5) What are the aims that culture dictates to education?
(6) What are the aims dictated to education by the developmental needs of the individual?

C. Strategic questions
(7) What are the educational means needed to prepare the child for his future life in society?
(8) What are the educational means supporting the introduction of young people into human culture?
(9) What are the educational means promoting the development of individuals?

D. Questions about the public in which and through which education takes place?
(10) Should education be uniform for all, or education for all but not uniform, or education for part of society only?
(11) What attributes are required by a person in order to become an educator?
(12) Taking all answers together - what is education?

We shall present the answers to these questions in order, as given by the three meta-ideologies of education: socialization, acculturation and individuation.

The answers of the meta-ideology of socialization to the basic questions of education
(1) Every society has the education it needs. An educational theory that supposedly signifies universality, pretending to guide educational activity everywhere and always, is non-existent. Education is fashioned according to the measures, aims and needs of the societies in which it functions. Modern society has set up educational methods and organized educational institutions according to its special needs. These needs, which education should fulfill, are of two types: training all the young people for general roles, such as citizenship or parenthood; and training them for specific roles. Each role will be positioned in the social structure - whether leadership, initiation and administration or various professional roles, simple or complex. The main need of society is training young people to take up roles in its various institutions (economic, political, familial, educational or value institutions). This training includes the transmission of knowledge entailed in fulfilling these roles, the feelings
accompanying these roles, ways of responding to common symbols, and other capabilities. Education must fulfill this need.

(2) Culture is the total sum of all of the above. Education training the child for proper functioning in the various institutions of society also imparts culture of that society. Talk of culture as separate from society or superior to it is nothing but the expression of dreams that may be beautiful and noble, but whose real value is not more than that of dreams. Education interfering with the child's training for life in a real society in the name of ideals derived from dreams hurts both the child and society.

(3) The child's development is a process in the course of which it gradually acquires knowledge, types of understanding, skills, and rules of common behavior in the society in which he lives. A child who has acquired until adulthood all he or she needs for successful functioning according to his or her position in society is one whose development has been orderly. A child who enters society without sufficient knowledge or without familiarity with society's rules of behavior is one whose development has not been orderly. To speak about development as a process guided only by internal processes of the child itself and independent of the social environment is to speak of something unreal. The development of the individual is in essence a process of growth into a society, according to its terms and rules.

(4) The needs of a society (see paragraph 1) are the aims of education.

(5) The concept "culture" entails nothing that is not already included in the concept "society." Society's needs also include those derived from culture. Educational aims dictated by culture are simultaneously derived from the needs of society.

(6) The developmental needs of the individual are a factor determining how and when to prepare him for his future roles. Thus, for example, it is only possible to teach him to read beginning with a certain age; but the need to teach him to read is derived from society and not from the child's development. Without society there would be no need to read, and reading would not have developed at all. So also in all other matters that education is required to teach the young: knowledge, skills, understanding and values. Education cultivates all of these because they are the needs of society. The method of their cultivation must be based on the child's readiness at its different developmental stages. To argue that the developmental needs of the child should dictate the aims of education is equivalent to turning matters upside-down. Development only determines when and how to educate; it is society that determines toward what to educate.

(7) The primary means available to education for preparing the child for his future life in society is to teach him all the rules, knowledge, skills and symbols needed by members of the society in their everyday life, and which the child will come across in his daily dealings. This learning normally occurs in societal frameworks, and the
child's participation in them prepares him to partake in society according to accepted norms. This participation teaches the child the three basic conducts found in human relationships: to obey, to command and to cooperate with equals. A condition for the success of this process is that the child will learn in the educational frameworks that his actions and behaviors may bring him rewards or subject him to sanctions, all according to his actions.

(8) As above.

(9) As above.

(10) All of these actions, including their aims and the preferred means for their achievement, should be carried out for all children of the society. The generality of formal and informal education alike is a clear need of modern society. Unlike former societies, it is impossible to ensure the proper socialization of the child if he does not participate intensively in the institutions of formal education, or if his immediate familial and social environment is significantly dysfunctional and unhealthy in an educational sense. This does not mean that the generality of education is to be taken as uniformity. All the children of a society do not need the same type of education, and one type of socialization for all children is not sufficient in modern society. The various alternatives of employment and the variety of roles required by modern society demand parallel and different educational tracks, some of which are open only to the most able: modern society needs first-rate scientists and technologists, inventors and initiators, in every domain of human action. Other tracks will be open to most youth, from whom will come most of those having roles in production and services required by society. Thus, there will be tracks for those limited in their intellectual or physical abilities, where they will learn to function in society according to their limited capabilities.

(11) The educational institution in society (as all its other institutions) functions through people, who in turn function according to the rules of that institution. People who function in the field of education in society may be divided into two groups. The first is that of the parents. The direct intervention of society in the way in which parents fulfill their roles is minimal. Only when it becomes clear that certain parents are not able to fulfill their educational roles due to their physical or mental condition does society intervene, usually by removing the children from their influence. This does not mean that society is indifferent to the conduct of parents, but its main intervention is indirect, and as such it is massive. Society provides parents, in many overt and covert ways, with the practices and values, the means and aims for educating their children, and its rules determine their position as parents.

The second group acting in the field of education in society is a professional group. It includes mainly teachers, as well as group leaders of clubs, editors of radio and
television programs, directors of children's theaters, and the like. As for these, society's intervention, both direct and indirect, is great. Society controls the actions of professional educators in many ways: curricula, official inspection apparatus, public opinion, and other means to ensure that educators working for society will do so according to its demands. The characteristic pointing to the ability of educators (parents and teachers alike) to fulfill their roles, and without which they cannot do this, is leadership.

(12) Education is a social function carried out consciously by parents and teachers, and unconsciously by other social elements. This function is aimed to instruct and prepare the younger generation toward life in society. Their main preparation for their future life in society is their acquisition of behaviors in accordance with their adult roles in society. Some of these are general roles equal for all (such as citizenship), and some are specific according to occupation or position in society. The education of a young person who has not learned to function in both types of roles is lacking, and he may fail in his life and trouble other members of the society.8

The answers of the meta-ideology of acculturation to the basic questions of education

(1) Society is an organization of people, fulfilling two functions: It enables them to carry out the struggle for survival more effectively, and it satisfies one of the basic human needs - the need to belong. In both these functions society is but an instrument. The use of instruments depends on the aims for the attainment of which they are used.

Society's aims are determined by the culture of the people living in it. It is culture, and not society, which should determine the aims of education.

(2) Culture is what human beings have made of themselves through their history. Human beings were originally part of nature, biological beings that lived and functioned similarly to all other natural beings. Through a multi-generation effort humans have exceeded the bounds of nature, began to determine their own ways of life, and freed themselves of the absolute laws of nature and environmental elements. Culture is the product of this effort. Since culture was created, humans are no longer "children of nature" but primarily "children of history," that they have make and continue to make. Humans have created their culture throughout their history, and created themselves through it. All that is human in man emanates from culture and creates it at the same time, just as all that is common to man and other living beings emanates from nature. Culture is man's new nature, one that he has created himself. Animals do not need education, as nature equips them with all they need for their lives. People need education, as they are not born with what they need for their lives, because the essence of their lives is not merely biological existence, as is that of other living beings. What is necessary for human life has to be learned. Culture is a store of
knowledge, understanding, values, etc., that each human child must learn in order to
shed his primordial animal state and be able to live a human life.

(3) The human individual is such due to the values of culture that he has internalized
during his development. The direction and content of education exist in the culture
and not in the individual, whose development is but a gradual internalization of
cultural values.

(4) See the answer to question 1.9

(5) An active intellect, a moral character and sensitivity to beauty are the aims of
educational activity; without them no activity may be called "education." Secondary
aims may be added to these primary aims of education, deriving from temporary
needs of the society, the nation or the state. But the primary aims of developing
intellect, morals and esthetic sense cannot be diminished without diminishing the
nature of education, because the aspiration toward them is the very essence of human
culture.

(6) The individual and his development do not dictate the aims of education. Although
they are a weighty component that must be taken into account in aspiring for its aims,
the source of the aims of education is in the culture and not in individual development
(see answer to question 5).

(7) Education is not meant to prepare the child for society but for life in it. It is meant
to teach him the needs of human culture. The ability to maintain a society based on
values is one of the basic principles of culture; therefore an education providing the
child with culture provides him with the necessary abilities for life in a society.

(8) The educational means needed to achieve the aims of education - the introduction
of young people into human culture - include on the one hand the educators and on
the other hand the contents of the culture. Only people with whom young people want
and can identify are worthy of being educators. By means of this identification the
young people are able to make the effort needed for learning the great achievements
of their culture in literature, philosophy, science, art, etc. Young people who cannot or
do not wish to identify with their teachers, or who do not make the effort to study the
cultural achievements, will not walk the path to improving their abilities and their
virtues - the path leading to culture.

(9) There is no development of the human being, only a process by means of which he
is transformed from what he was originally - a biological being - into a cultured
person. The contents of a culture are therefore the means by which the development of
the individual is promoted (see answer to question 8).
(10) An education deserving of its name is one that selects the best candidates and draws them forward to improving their abilities, capabilities and virtues as much as possible. Education must equip all young people with what they are able to absorb of culture. Yet the first concern of education are those who will become the elite of society, for only they will be the guardians of culture as it has crystallized until their time, and it is they who will continue to nurture it and enrich it for the benefit of future generations.

(11) In order to be an educator a person must be cultured in the full sense of the term. An educator does not carry out his duty by means of his knowledge but first and foremost by means of his personality. Only he who have internalized the values of the culture, which form his personality and control it, can be a role model for the youth through whom they may internalize the values in the same way as their educator. A person's personality and familiarity with the cultural values determine his or her suitability to serve as an educator of the young.

(12) Education is a consciously directed process whose function is to endow young people's souls with cultural values. It is a process by which the personality of the young is molded by restraining their primordial biological nature and causing them to accept and obey the human values developed in the course of history. The main part of this process occurs when the youth identify with their educators, thereby internalizing the principles, values and virtues of the culture. The principle of internalization on which acculturation is based requires the goodwill and cooperation of the youth in their own education: In order to achieve success in education, a young person must be willing to be educated in the spirit of the culture. If, for some reason, the educator has not succeeded in awaking the goodwill or cooperation of the young person, he has no choice but to force education on him. Without education, no man can realize his human nature, that is to attain the level in which he may judge by means of his own mental and spiritual powers, without outside help, what he should do, think, believe, etc.10

The answers of the meta-ideology of individuation to the basic questions of education
(1) Present-day society functions by means of the domination of a few interest groups. In order to maintain their supremacy, rulers throughout history have been distorting human nature by means of education. They continue to do so today, in order that people will comply although they are exploited and oppressed. The interests of the rulers in present-day society, presented as the interests of the society as a whole, dictate the course of education in that society. Education in present-day societies is a mechanism for the mental and spiritual oppression of the people according to the needs of the rulers. It fulfils this function by distorting the personality of the young people growing up in the society.
(2) The above is valid not only for society, but for present-day culture as well. Culture is by and large a mechanism of oppression meant to distort people's personalities so that they will accept their oppression, thus to assure the rulers' positions.

(3) The individual only, and his nature, can serve as the source for determining the direction and purpose of education. In the same way, only his interests can serve as a yardstick for the society and culture. Society, culture and education achieve their aim only when their actions, institutions and principles fit the developmental needs of the individual. When educational activities stand in contradiction to these needs, they do not achieve their aim. Society, culture and education as they are today, are completely contrary to the needs of the individual, and thus they do not achieve their aim in the least.

The needs of the growing individual are his developmental needs. A proper society and a proper culture, such that may come to be one day, will support the unhindered development of the individual and his self-fulfillment. Present-day society and culture do all in their power to hinder people's self-realization, that is, they usually succeed in destroying their development. Thus, the personality of most people in today's world is distorted and sick.

(4) Present-day society dictates to education the following aims: conformity and obedience, emotional obtuseness and estrangement, clannishness (from the patriotism of a football team to national patriotism), xenophobia, mental impassiveness on the one hand and aggressiveness in mutual competition on the other, setting value to phenomena in the world according to price rather than intrinsic value, and others. These aims are not referred to by these names, yet they guide present-day education.

(5) Present-day culture dictates to education the same aims as does society (see answer to question 4), although they are usually presented in a sophisticated conceptual guise. Western culture terms conformity and obedience "internal discipline;" emotional obtuseness and estrangement are termed "character building;" clannishness and xenophobia - "national education;" competitive aggressiveness - "achievement" or "education for excellence;" the valuation of phenomena by their price and not their intrinsic value - "education for rational thinking," etc.

(6) We may present these aims as maximal avoidance of the direction of development. The best education, from the point of view of the developmental needs of the individual, is non-education. Development knows its direction without external guidance, and any intervention only distort its direction. Educators must do with the removal of obstacles from the youth's path, and must not impose on his development their own intentions and preferences. The individual was not born to fulfil directives of the society or the culture into which he was accidentally born, but to realize his
freedom in life. Freedom is the aim of education that derives from the very essence of
the individual as a human being.

(7) The individual growing in an atmosphere of freedom learns through interaction
with his peers and with people older or younger than himself all he needs for such
interaction with people in the future.

(8) An individual whose educators do not interfere with his motives will learn the
cultural achievements that interest him by virtue of his interest. No one will succeed
in teaching a youth what does not interest him. The imposition of learning in present-
day education does not teach what it pretends to be teaching, but only the principle of
coercion. The young person learns through present-day education that he is controlled
by others and therefore must not rely on himself, on his brain and his feelings, and
most of all - that he is not responsible for his thoughts and his feelings.

(9) The major educational means for supporting the proper development of the
individual is freedom. Freedom in education means that educators do not enforce their
wishes or preferences upon the lives and deeds of young people, but allow them to act
according to their own wishes and preferences. The inborn self-regulation of the child
is the best guidance mechanism. Curricula and methods of action externally imposed
upon the young impair their capability of self-regulation and even destroy it. Once
their self-regulation is destroyed, people require throughout their lives teachers,
instructors and leaders who will tell them what to do.

(10) Children from all social strata, all nations and religions, will eventually discover
their human nature that was not distorted through education by belonging to social
strata, folk or religion. The only education worthy of its name is that guided by the
developmental needs of the individual. It is an education towards freeing people from
oppression to societal frameworks and false beliefs implanted in them by culture.

(11) Only a mentally balanced person is worthy of fulfilling the role of an educator.
Such a person is not drawn to the role of educator in order to satisfy his own need to
dominate others, nor to fill the lack of love in his life. A balanced person does not
need to pretend to be what he is not, and to play the role of the leader (as in
socialization) or the role model (as in acculturation). He dares to be himself, thus
encouraging his pupils to be themselves. Uncovering people's souls from the masks
behind which they hide - not only from others but also from themselves - is the first
step towards freeing a person. Only an educator who is a free man himself can create
such emotional situations in which his pupil can free himself.

(12) Education as it should be is the organization of situations in which children grow
in a way that allows them to realize themselves, their capabilities, their abilities, their
personal traits - in short, their whole personality. Education is essentially an act of
preventing pitfalls and removing obstacles, and never an act of guidance or leading towards aims chosen by teachers for their pupils. An individual's self-realization is possible since he is inherently free as a human being. Every act that restricts the individual's freedom necessarily detracts from his humanity, and is therefore an act of taming. Education, in contrast to taming (and in contrast to other education-like yet non-educational acts such as indoctrination, propaganda, advertising, etc.), is an act of freeing man from the shackles which society and culture are constantly trying to force upon him.11

The difference between political and educational ideologies

The criterion for classifying educational decisions into the three groups presented above and referred to as "the meta-ideologies of education," is that of action. This classification ignores the level of abstraction of the various educational theories, the areas in which they were formulated, the language used in them, and all other differences but one: the kind of action required by their decisions. From the point of view of the kinds of action required by the decisions on all the basic questions of education, there are only three possible modes of action truly different from each other: those carried out in the spirit of socialization, in the spirit of acculturation, or in the spirit of individuation. Most educational theories are not intrinsically coherent, in that their formulators decided on one issue according to one ideology, and on another issue - according to another. Since every educational theory (guiding educational practice) contains decisions on a variety of issues, there are many possibilities for combinations between decisions stemming from the different ideologies. This explains the many educational theories formulated over history, and conceals the fact that in any specific issue there are no more than three different possibilities of action.

Actions guided by the socialization ideology are more common in education in families, in schools and other educational frameworks than educators are willing to admit. Israeli educators prefer in their declarations solutions derived from the ideology of acculturation, although in practice they often use actions derived from the socialization ideology.12 Socialization is the original ideology of public education. The frameworks of public education were erected in order to prepare young people for the roles they would have to fulfill in time in the society in which they live. This preparation includes imparting functional patterns of behavior from the social point of view, imparting role-dependent knowledge, conditioning of feelings, attitudes and values of the same type, and other such actions. One must remember that public education was originally meant for the poor, for those who did not study at home with private tutors or in exclusive private schools. This school was held responsible for the socialization of the "common" people. The aristocracy, the rich (of blood or of wealth) did not need elementary schools, or socialization of the type that these schools imparted to their pupils. They needed at the time education of the kind guided by the ideology of acculturation, which is the ideology that originally directed the education
of the rulers. This ideology did not follow the values and the real needs of society, but the cultural tradition of humanity over the ages.

Institutionally, acculturation became the educational theory of all secondary schools. At all times, up to the very present, they served only the social elite - except those in the United States, that have been democratically oriented (directed by the idea of equality) from the very beginning. These schools offered education of a different type from that of elementary schools, not only in its level. It was the type of education meant to prepare a ruling classes and leaders of society. The elementary school in western countries served for a long period as an institution for the poor, guided by the ideology of socialization. On the other hand, the secondary school (with its various names such as elementary school, grammar school, Realschule, lycee, gymnansium, etc.) served as a school for children of the ruling classes, guided by the ideology of acculturation. The education of the oppressed lower classes, guided by the ideology of socialization, served to oppress basic human aspirations: the aspiration for freedom and knowledge, for a meaningful life and the satisfaction derived from it. This type of education gave birth for many generations to people estranged from their humanity, who felt at ease in a passive dominated crowd, who always needed a leader to guide them and tell them what to do. Such people would not only accept their fate but would justify it, and for long period did not demand a better fate.

The education of people for being dominated demanded the paralyzing of their capabilities for initiative and individual action; preventing the appearance of ideas of organizing for the defense of human rights, and mostly - improving thinking capabilities beyond those needed for daily life and for the fulfillment of the socio-economic roles entrusted to them. Such as education was certainly not suited to those meant to be leaders of society and rulers of the masses. These required an education encouraging activity guided by self-initiative, logical thinking, a measure of intellectual autonomy, capability of judgment and evaluation, competitiveness and aggression. What they needed was acculturation; this was originally the education of the sons of the ruling classes in preparation for their roles as rulers.13

At a later stage, the ruled understood the meaning of the double-track education, one of whose tracks was "common" and one "elitist." Once they understood this, a struggle began on the political level for the unification of the educational system, and for granting an equal opportunity to all social classes in a uniform school. As a result, a uniform school was created, common to all children in the society. At first it was only the "public" school, which at this time changed its name to ""primary," and later a gradual unification began of the "secondary school" - which has not yet been completed in most countries of the world.

The uniform school was at first controlled by both ideologies - socialization and acculturation. The last, however, began to fill in it a new role - classification of pupils
in order to place them in social roles. Before the uniform school was formed, this classification into social roles was carried out outside the school. Parents who could afford to send their children to a secondary school thus determined their place in society. Only few people with but a primary education achieved social positions carrying high rewards and prestige. When the schools were unified, the task of placing young people in different social roles, prestigious and non-prestigious, fell to it. Schools were also given the task of classifying the students into two groups: those who would be directed toward further education towards being placed in complex and difficult social roles whose rewards and prestige were high, and those who would be turned towards work and positions of a lower level. It was no surprise, apparently, that the children of the rich were found suitable for further studies and leading positions, and the children of the poor, generation after generation, were found at the end of their primary studies to be suitable for all sorts of labor needed by society.

The achievements by which the pupils were classified for generations were derived from the aims of acculturation, which enforced on the schools the values of the middle class. Pupils who were not born into this class were doomed to fail in this classification. On the other hand, middle class children felt very much at home in the schools, and the higher their families were on this social scale, the better were their chances of success. In this way, acculturation continued to serve the interests of the ruling classes. It kept the top positions for the sons of those who already occupied them. The uniform school functioned all along as a classifying instrument that placed the young in different social roles, while preserving the privileges of the ruling classes. The others were prepared by the school for positions society had assigned them, after inculcating them with the consciousness of being backward in comparison to the former. By causing them to fail - a daily occurrence - school prepared the poor for their future failure in society.\textsuperscript{14}

The third meta-ideology, individuation, came about as a result of the situation in schools after their unification, and of parallel educational practices current in the homes. This ideology exposed the social roles of the two former ideologies, placed itself in the service of the individual, and released him from his obligations to the prevalent society and to the governing culture. This ideology brought about the radical streams in education, whose greatest outburst occurred in the sixties of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. These streams opposed all philosophies (i.e. ideologies) that guided education over the generations. They offered a Copernican-like revolution in educational thinking: It is not man who is to be adapted to prevalent society or to the current culture, but vice versa - society and culture must adapt themselves to man as he is, in order to serve his needs, especially his developmental needs.\textsuperscript{15}

The ideology of individuation exposed the role of acculturation as a mechanism of selection through which privileges were assured to part of the youth growing up in a society - those of the middle class - and the rights of others were curtailed. This
ideology exposed the role of schools and other educational frameworks as a mechanism perpetuating inequality among people and injustice in society. It states that as long as external criteria, such as social needs or cultural values, guide education, the latter will not cease to be a mechanism of oppression damaging people's development and distorting their personalities.

The ideology of individuation has till now not guided educational practice in the educational system. Except for a few experimental schools that have existed but a short time, the ideologists of this theory have not succeeded in implementing it in practice. The role of this ideology in education has been that of a favorable model used for critical evaluation of present conditions. This evaluation has spawned occasional partial ideas for improvement that have been adapted by present-day schools, without their undergoing a radical change and ceasing to be what they have always been. These ideas sometimes brought about more flexibility in the curriculum, operation of methods of self-activation of pupils regulated somewhat by their motivation, and mostly - approval of a spirit of permissiveness in education that was adopted to a different degree by many middle class families.

The connection between the three meta-ideologies of education and the main political ideologies is quite clear. Socialization suits well the politico-social ideology of the present-day social order. It contributes to it significantly by inculcating a justification of this order into the minds of the governed, and prepares them for the roles that society expects them to fulfill. Acculturation acts in the same direction, but among the ruling population that enjoy privileges in the existing order, at the same time blocking the way of the governed to ruling positions in society. In contrast to the other two ideologies, individuation is a utopian vision of a new, reformed society. As such, it is the educational ideology of radical political and social streams that aspire to transform society.16

Although these characteristics are correct on a high level of abstraction, they are not sufficient on the concrete level. They do not explain, for example, why so many middle class people prefer the ideology of individuation although it denies them their privileges over the lower classes; while the lower classes usually reject it, although it protects their interests. Why, a short time after the revolution in Russia, the regime set up a conservative educational system guided since then by a mixture of the socialization and acculturation ideologies; and why some religious educational circles in the West have accepted educational ideas stemming from the ideology of individuation.

The answers to these questions require a purposeful examination of the guiding ideologies of education under given social and political situations. Such an examination will reveal the contrasts that bring about specific ideologies in specific historical conditions. Many and various specific ideologies may dwell within the
boundaries of one meta-ideology - such as those of religious and humanistic education, both belonging by way of their preferred solutions to the meta-ideology of acculturation.
Notes


7. The concept "culture" in this context has a value meaning. For a clarification of the difference between a value meaning and a factual meaning of the concept "culture," see my entry "culture", in the *Hebrew Encyclopedia*, XXXII, pp. 1055-1059, and in the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, V, pp. 939-942 (both in Hebrew).


Conversation with Yoram Harpaz:  
From Ideology as Education to Education as Ideology

Harpaz: I believe it's possible to summarize the central axis of your educational thinking by the phrase "From ideology as education to education as ideology." Initially you dealt mainly with ideological education, educational theories derived from social ideologies and serving them. Your Ph.D. dissertation, written under Prof. E. Simon and presented in 1967, entitled Ideology and Education, examined the nature of "educational theories deducted from ideologies."

In the second phase, you turned to the nature of teaching. In a broad empirical paper - Images of Teaching: A Study of Opinions, Ideologies and Outlooks of Teachers and Applicants for Teaching Positions (1969) - you examined teachers' thoughts about teaching. Your assumption was that "what is singular to teaching is the process of thinking in order to choose between optional behaviors." You found that there is not one education but three different "educations," with different aims and means. You expressed this in your book Conflicting Theories in Instruction (1972).

In the third phase, you found that the conflicting "logics" in instruction, as well as each educational theory belonging to one or another of these "logics," has an epistemological structure - "a cognitive system" - similar to the structure of an ideology. After this discovery you termed the "logics" educational "meta-ideologies." Thus your thought, that started as ideology as education, closed the circle with education as ideology. Motives in an empirical study turned into "logics," and "logics" turned into "meta-ideologies." This paper accomplishes the "great synthesis" of the three main phases of your thought.

Lamm: This is a sound description of my process of thinking.

Harpaz: You claim that educational theory and ideology have a similar "cognitive system." You define a "cognitive system" (science, religion, art, ideology, etc.) as "a specific strategy of man to assault reality in order to understand it," and claim that ideology is a very special system, as it operates different "primary" strategies. The cognitive system of an ideology has four elements: eschatology - an image of the world to be aspired to (a religious-like element); diagnosis - a description of the faulty reality that must be rectified (scientific-like element); strategy - specification of the means for realizing the world depicted by the first element; and identification with the collective - the target population to which ideology turns in order to mobilize it. Ideology is created from a fusion of these four elements into one whole.

This fusion causes a distortion of each of the elements. Thus, in the framework of an ideology, the diagnosis does not describe reality as it is, in scientific criteria, but in a way that will fit it into the aims of the ideology, into its eschatology. The strategy is
not a rational adjustment of the means to the aim, but a necessary element of the
dogma demanding loyalty at all costs (even if it is not rational - does not fit the aim).
Therefore, the ideology is an irrational cognitive system, a "false consciousness" - not
in the Marxist sense of a supposedly universal "super-structure" that serves particular
class interests, but in the sense of an "inner" falsification wholly within the sphere of
consciousness. But ideology, this false consciousness, is inevitable. People need an
ideology when: (1) they must make a personal, social or political decision; (2) they
face several options; (3) there is no rational or empirical way to decide in favor of one
of the options. Faced with one of these situations, more or less pressing, they need an
ideology. People confront such situations many times during their lives. The
ideologies they choose, or even create, in these situations are not necessarily
"institutional" - formulated and well-known such as socialism, liberalism, feminism,
Zionism and the like; they may be "unspecified" ideologies - personal ideologies,
quite fluid, that have no common name.

Lamm: Permit me to add that to be rational in this case means that a person is
conscious of the fact that he, like any other, needs an ideology in order to function in
the world and to understand it; and at the same time - that his ideology, like any other,
is an irrational cognitive system.

Harpaz: This state of consciousness is similar to that called by Karl Frankenstein
"ambiguity" (Die Ausserlichkeit des Lebensstils. Amsterdam, 1959), in which a
person is conscious of the essential, insoluble conflicts in which he lives. I believe
that you see in this state, like he did (although you give it a different connotation), a
sign of spiritual, mental and emotional maturity that must be aspired to in the course
of education.

Lamm: I don't know whether this state of consciousness to the irrationality of
ideology, and to the necessity to adopt an ideology, answers the definition of
"ambiguity," but I certainly think that this consciousness is a noteworthy human
achievement and a sign of spiritual maturity. In short, everyone needs an ideology; it
is in people's attitude toward their ideology that they differ: are they willing to kill and
die for it always and in all circumstances, or are they critical of it and waver about it?

Harpaz: When it comes to ideology, you believe in a weak, lean-type of rationality.
To be rational is to be conscious of the irrationality of the ideology (or ideologies) that
one inevitably needs. Later we will look into your argument that the category
"rationality" in a strong sense cannot be applied to ideology. Meanwhile, let us
continue to describe the gist of the paper. So far, you have not added much to what
you have written years ago about the essence of ideology, about its four-cornered
structure. The novelty of this paper is in its claim that "all that is said in education,
whether termed philosophy of education or pedagogy, theory of education or
didactics, educational outlook or any other name, is nothing but ideology." This
means that educational theories are actually ideologies, cognitive systems without a rational basis, or - in the words of Karl Popper, whose spirit hovers over your views of science, ideology and rationality - that cannot be refuted. Educational theories pretend to be theories - coherent conceptual frameworks, simple and predictable, that can be refuted by observations; but actually, they are conceptual constructs based on irrational decisions and arbitrary value preferences, just castles in the air.

*Lamm:* I'm not certain about the metaphor "castles in the air," but I certainly claim that educational theories have the structure of an ideology, and this means that no single educational theory is more correct, true or rational than others. All are equally irrational.

*Harpaz:* Let me try to uncover the hidden part of this claim. I imagine this is what you mean:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Socio-political ideology</th>
<th>Educational ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eschatology (aim)</strong></td>
<td>Image of desired society</td>
<td>Image of &quot;desired adult,&quot; &quot;educated human&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diagnosis</strong></td>
<td>Description of actual society in the light of the image of a desirable society</td>
<td>Description of actual pupils in the light of the image of desirable pupils, &quot;educated adults&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy</strong></td>
<td>Means by which to transform actual society into desirable society, in the realization of eschatology</td>
<td>Didactics, methods of instruction aimed toward closing the gap between actual pupils and desirable pupils, &quot;educated adults&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective</strong></td>
<td>The public that will rectify society, or for whom society must be rectified</td>
<td>The special pupil population to be handled, toward whom educational theory is aimed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Educational ideology, like the socio-political ideology, fits its diagnosis to its pedagogical eschatology - to its aims. Educational (ideological) theories discover (invent) "scientific knowledge" about learning, development, society and the like, or interpret scientific knowledge about these and other topics in a way that will fit their aims. The mentality of the adherents of educational (ideological) theories is also a typical ideological mentality: educators often hold on to their theories (ideologies) in a fashion worthy of the greatest zealots. Did you refer to this similarity in the cognitive systems?

*Lamm:* Yes, this seems a correct enough representation of my views.

*Harpaz:* Let us continue with the paper. After establishing the argument that educational theories are ideologies, you divided them into three families, calling them
"meta-ideologies." These are the three "logics" of instruction familiar from your former writing that are "ideal types" of educational theories, each preferring one of the "masters" of education - society, culture, or the individual. According to the first "logic" called "socialization," the aim of education is to adapt the individual to society, and it gives rise to a pattern of instruction called "imitation;" according to the second "logic" called "acculturation," the aim of education is to mold the character and thinking of the individual in the spirit of values and principles embodied in culture, and it gives rise to a pattern of instruction called "molding;" according to the third "logic" called "individuation," the aim of education is to enable the development of the individual according to his initial inclinations and motives, and it gives rise to a pattern of instruction called "development." Each educational theory (ideology) perforce belongs to one or more of these "logics," or "meta-ideologies." If a theory (ideology) belongs to two or more "logics," it suffers from internal conflict because the "logics" are conflicting. Let us dwell for a moment on this oppressing conflict. People naturally strive for a harmony of all the good things, and you claim that it is impossible to educate simultaneously for the achievement of behaviors and skills needed for social adjustment, for the internalization of cultural principles and values, and for self-realization and personal autonomy. All of these are very important, the very heart of education, and you claim that it is impossible to achieve harmony between them.

**Lamm:** When I wrote this paper, the issue was not yet completely clear in my mind. I have since clarified it to myself. Side by side with the "pure" ideologies - socialization, acculturation and individuation - there are two types of eclectic ideologies, built on a combination of two or three meta-ideologies. Such eclecticism combines the meta-ideologies by means of some organizing principle, such as the combination of socialization and individuation in Dewey's thinking, or the combination of acculturation and individuation in Whitehead's thinking. In another type of eclecticism, a certain area of educational practice is dominated by one meta-ideology while another area - by another meta-ideology. Thus, in a nationalistic educational system, the history of the "fatherland" is taught with a different ideological spirit than that of the history of the "nations." In principle, most ideologies that guide education in practice are eclectic, of one of the two above-mentioned types.

**Harpaz:** Let us, however, examine the possibilities for combining the "logics" dialectically, without conflict. Your method - that of conflicting logics in instruction, is based on differentiation between the individual and society, and between the individual and culture. The differentiated and crystallized society and culture confronts a differentiated and crystallized individual, one with "primary motives," with "human nature," an individual good or evil from his youth. But is there really such an individual, differentiated and crystallized from youth, with an essence striving for self-realization?
Clifford Geertz, in his book *The Interpretations of Cultures* summarized his viewpoint thus (I paraphrase): The conclusion to be drawn is that culture, more than it is an appendage built onto a being whose development has ended, or about to end, is an element - a central element - in the very creation of this being. These changes in the structure of the human brain may not in themselves be so striking; but in conjunction with them, some conclusions may be drawn about the nature of the human being, that lead us far away not only from the concept of human nature prevalent in the eighteenth century, but even from that prevalent in anthropology until ten or fifteen years ago. In short, they lead to the understanding that human nature independent of culture is non-existent.

Thus, I suggest, the individual becomes an individual through his encounter with culture and society (who are in turn created by their encounter with the individual). If the individual, society and culture are created mutually, why not try to think of a dialectic, complex synthesis between the three "logics" of instruction?

We may also view it from another angle. As you often wrote, the means of education, as differing from other contexts, are not neutral in their aims: a person may reach town in his private car, by public transport or on a donkey - the town does not care which. But a person cannot educate for an unequivocal belief through the pupils' choice of the topics and methods of instruction; as one cannot educate toward democracy using coercion about the topics and methods of teaching. In education, the means are steeped in aims. This is the reason for the fact that in education the medium is the message, the method is the content of teaching. Thus, if the foci from which the aims are derived - society, culture and the individual - are interwoven and develop mutually, in a dialectical connection, and the means are interwoven with the aims - must we not think about an educational framework in which "logics" and "instruction patterns" are conceptually interwoven?

*Lamm:* There are two issues here. First, I fully accept Geertz's statement that "human nature independent of culture is nonexistent." The educational question is how the individual internalizes culture, or how he models himself through it: By direct participation in it? By identifying with figures who represent it? By practicing its customs? True, there is no human nature independent of culture; but the characteristics of this culture are determined by the way in which the individual relates to the culture in the course of his maturation; and there are, as we saw, three such ways.

Second, A person's education in modern society requires his confrontation with frameworks, relationships, contents, etc. that are operated by the three ideologies. I argue that it is impossible to apply all three ideologies efficiently in one educational framework. You remarked that in education, the means are interwoven with the aims. Since each ideology has its own aim, so each ideology has its own means, and these
means conflict with each other. For example, it is impossible to educate for strict imitation and for original initiative in a single educational framework. Therefore, how can we present to young people all the ideologies, their aims and their means? We can do this in separate educational frameworks - school, youth movement, sports club, enrichment classes, family and the like. Each such framework must act consistently in an ideological spirit suited to its aims. In a modern society, young people must be exposed to different ideological trends. They will then create themselves through confrontation and struggle with them.

Harpaz: In the last part of your article you show that every educational "meta-ideology" is an interpretive whole that answers according to its own logic the basic educational questions derived from the four-sided structure of the ideology. There seem to be three autonomic educational paradigms that supply full answers to each question. Passing from one paradigm to the next requires an almost total transformation of the point of view. Is one paradigm preferable in any way to the others? Is it truer or more advanced in any way, in general or under special circumstances?

Lamm: Yes, if you believe it. A person who believes in open education, for example, is convinced that this education is truer than other, even more advanced forms, and humanity's hopes rest upon it. But for the researcher of educational ideologies as a researcher, there is no answer to this question: all ideologies are, or should be, equal before him. But as a person he may have, and probably does have an affinity for one of the ideologies. As a researcher, he should heed Bacon's advice to every student of nature, "...to take this as a rule, - that whatever his mind seize and dwells upon with peculiar satisfaction is to be held in suspicion, is to be taken in dealings with such questions to keep the understanding even and clear" (Bacon, F. Novum Organum, LVIII [S. Commins & R. R. N. Linscott (eds.), The Philosophers of Science, New York, 1954, p. 96]).

Harpaz: I should like to examine another worrisome issue about the affinity between rationality and ideology. You claim that there is no such affinity: to say of an ideology that it is rational is a categorical error. This argument encompasses a clear differentiation between two cognitive systems - ideology and science. A scientific theory may be rational or irrational, as it may in principle be refuted; while an educational theory (ideology) is irrational, as it is based on wishes, value inclinations, emotional commitment and other "soft" subjective elements that are not given to refutation. They do not describe the world, and the category "truth" does not apply to them. It seems that this Popperian differentiation between science and ideology has grown weaker in the past few years. It seems that science is more ideological, and ideologies are more scientific than appears in your differentiation. Science is more ideological, as scientific theories are not easily refuted through "decisive observation;" scientists have a set of other considerations of an ideological-like
character for holding on to a certain theory. Also, it is possible that ideologies have a somewhat scientific-like character: there are refuted eschatologies, completely detached from reality, and there are plausible and applicable eschatologies; there is a false ideological diagnosis and there is a fair and honest diagnosis. Thus, there are more or less rational ideologies. My question is therefore, is there no rational way to choose in "real time," and not only from a historical perspective, among competing ideologies?

Lamm: Let me repeat here a basic, self-evident, modern truth: Science is the best source of knowledge about the world; and another truth, maybe more problematic but nevertheless true: There is development in science. One paradigm is better than another; Einstein's, for example, is better than Newton's, and explains more. If every paradigm is a gestalt that is neither better nor worse than any another, and there is incommensurability between them, then why should we make the effort to trade one paradigm for another? It is true that social sciences are not "scientific" in the sense of natural sciences, but they too have a method - form hypotheses, collecting data, creating a theory, etc. Social sciences exceed the bounds of science when they try to draw from their theories recommendations for a proper life - for example, to draw from a sociological theory a recommendation for integration in education. Ideology does exactly that - it hopelessly confuse the actual with the desirable.

To answer your question more precisely: There are no ideologies that are truer or more scientific than others. As ideologies, they necessarily derive from value preferences, emotional biases and aspirations that cannot be evaluated in criteria such as "true" or "scientific." The only essential element differentiating between ideologies is the individual's attitude toward them. An ideology held by a "true and dogmatic believer" is different from one held by a "critical believer," an open-minded person who is willing to judge it by its outcomes.

Harpaz: Thus, people do not choose an ideology on a rational basis, nor do they renounce it because it was "refuted."

Lamm: Of course. By the way, I have a whole library dealing with people espousing and renouncing ideologies, the subject fascinates me. Espousing an ideology and renouncing it are closely related. It's possible to formulate an almost-scientific law about this: The strength of a person's hold on an ideology is in direct relation to the measure of his distress when he espoused this ideology. If he was in dire distress, in a total loss of an orientation, when he espoused a certain ideology, he will not renounce it easily, but will hold on to it for the rest of his life. He is indebted to the ideology for giving meaning to his life, putting it in order, and restoring his self-respect. However, people renounce an ideology not only because their distress was not deep enough when they espoused it, but also because the ideology has hit a raw nerve in them. For example, Ignatio Silone left the communist party because he was asked by Dimitrov -
head of the Komintern and later Prime Minister of Bulgaria - in the name of Stalin, to sign a declaration denouncing Trotsky. When Silone asked why he should denounce Trotsky, Dimitrov said that was because of an article he had written. Silone asked to read the article, and received the answer: "What, you don't believe the Secretary General?" His responsibility for his own signature was Silone's raw nerve, and he left the Communist party and later renounced the ideology. I could tell you of other such raw nerves, extra-ideological deep sensitivities, the damage to which caused well known (and lesser known) people to detach themselves from an ideology they had been devoted to.

Harpaz: These are dramatic renouncements, where people suddenly deny their own ideologies. There are other, quiet renouncements, where ideologies "renounce" people and slowly fade away. I'm thinking of people in the Kibbutz where I was born - they have slowly been emptied of the socialist-Zionist ideology that had filled them.

Lamm: Yes, there are also such renouncements. We may say of them that existence determines consciousness. Kibbutz members have passed from a proletarian to a bourgeois existence; they have become property owners and employers. Under these circumstances, you were right to say that the ideology has forsaken them, and has slowly faded away.

Harpaz: Let us return to the topic of rationality and ideology. "Logics" have a structure of ideologies, which means that one "logic" is not a-priori preferable to another. You claim in several places that a rational choice of one "logic" or another depends on circumstances, mainly on the nature of the learners; in some instances it is right to choose one "logic," in others - another. However, you side a-priori with the logic of individuation, citing in your papers several arguments for it: This "logic" serves the true "client" of education; it reflects the internal interest of education; it caters best to the needs of our democratic knowledge society (individuation is the best socialization); it fosters internal motivation for learning and self-regulated learning, etc. These are your own rational reasons, quite convincing, for a certain educational ideology ("logic").

Lamm: Yes, I am inclined toward individuation, though not under all circumstances; this is my ideological choice. Without such a choice it is impossible to function in education and to say something meaningful about what ought to be. I believe this choice is better than a choice for other ideologies, but I'm aware that it is an ideological choice and therefore not better founded than other ideological choices. If my arguments convince you, it only points to the fact that they are convincing for you.

Harpaz: Don't you sometimes long for the often-discredited era of ideologies? We spoke previously of human consciousness as a tin containing a soft drink. At least
during the ideological era, the tins were filled with a richer, more uplifting liquid; people lived beyond the here and now.

*Lamm:* I'm not in the least nostalgic for that era. Ideologies robbed people of their own thoughts. They offered something to the believers, but caused them despair when they failed them.